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Abstract 
This article analyses the horizontal effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. Horizontal effect has been an integral part of the Union’s 
application of fundamental rights, especially in the field of equality. However, the 
codification of fundamental rights in the Charter raises important questions as to how 
horizontal effect will continue to apply in the EU, particularly in the aftermath of the 
Court’s rulings in cases such as Dominguez and AMS. This article argues that the 
emphasis on prior approaches to horizontal effect in recent rulings fails to address 
the more profound issues that the horizontal effect of a fundamental rights catalogue 
raises. Meaningfully engaging with horizontality involves answering directional 
questions: what role does the Charter play in the Union’s constitutional framework 
and what can horizontality achieve in respect of EU rights protection? Overall, the 
article calls for a new approach in the Charter context, in which horizontality can be 
assessed against a sound theoretical framework, conscious of the role of rights in 
society rather than their positioning in different types of legislation.   
 
I. Introduction  
 
Just over five years ago, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
acquired legally binding force.1 Its provisions include the rights enshrined in the 
ECHR, a broad set of employment rights, as well as EU citizens’ rights, to mention 
but a few. Thus, the Charter appears to confirm the ‘fundamentally constitutive status’ 
of these rights in the EU legal order and can play a constructive role in their further 
development.2 The Charter’s interpretation also raises several questions regarding the 
future of the Union’s fundamental rights regime, which are of ‘profound 
constitutional complexity’. 3  Whether and, if so, to what extent the Charter’s 
provisions will affect private parties through the application of the horizontality 
doctrine, is one such question. The horizontal effect of a bill of rights can impact how 
individuals live with and behave towards each other in a particular community, and 
can greatly influence the way we perceive the role of private actors in the application 	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1 Together with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, on 1 December 2009. 
2 C. Thornhill, ‘The Formation Of A European Constitution: An Approach From Historical-Political 
Sociology’ (2012) 8 International Journal of Law in Context 354, 382.  
3 P. Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question’ (2002) 39 Common 
Market Law Review 945, 946. 
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of fundamental rights standards. Despite the importance of the issues it raises though, 
the horizontality debate in EU law has, until now, mainly focused on the status of 
particular rights (as directive-based or Treaty-based) and on the limits of the Charter’s 
scope under Article 51 thereof.4 This paper argues that, while these considerations 
may be important in technically analysing the horizontality doctrine, they are not 
instructive in respect of the first-order reasons that actually justify its application.  
 The ascription of binding effect to the Union’s first comprehensive bill of 
rights, even if it is one that merely enhances the visibility of existing rights5, has 
‘clear constitutional overtones’.6 It is necessarily linked with debates regarding the 
Union’s democracy deficit, its future, and the relationship between the EU and the 
Member States in respect of fundamental rights issues. Discussing the Charter’s 
horizontal effect thus raises questions which cannot be answered either by simply 
making reference to prior case law, or by invoking the Charter’s scope as an absolute 
benchmark. A much more forward-looking assessment is necessary: rather than 
making abstract references to ‘the Charter’ at large, it is essential to discuss the 
content of its provisions and the potential effects of their horizontal application. In 
addition, in granting horizontal effect to any or all of these provisions, an important 
question of principle must be tackled, namely whether horizontal effect is compatible 
with the values that the Charter is intended to advance within the Union and the role it 
plays within its evolving constitutional framework.  
 Of course, it is impossible to discuss these complex issues exhaustively in one 
paper, so it is necessary to set out some of its limitations from the start. This article 
takes on a reconstructive exercise: it analyses the Court’s case law from the angle of 
horizontal effect qua tool in constitutional rights adjudication, rather than looking at 
horizontal effect qua EU doctrine, strictly construed and detached from conceptual 
underpinnings. It thus seeks, primarily, to identify the shortcomings of the Court’s 
practice in this field from the perspective of rights protection at the supranational 
level. Secondly, it seeks to highlight the important possibilities for rights protection 
that a more thorough assessment of horizontality can give rise to. These are of deep 
value to the individuals claiming them: they concern important aspects of their lives, 
such as work, family and personal development. The horizontal effect of the Charter 
is inextricably linked with the extent to which the EU affects these questions. While 
the article does not prescribe a single horizontality formula to address all of them, it 
seeks to steer the debate in their direction, so that they can start to feature more 
prominently in the reasoning underlying the horizontality doctrine in the field of 
fundamental rights in the future.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See for example : Case C-176/12 Association de Médiation Sociale v Hichem Laboubi (hereafter 
‘AMS’), judgment of 15 January 2014, nyr; Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, delivered on 8 
September 2011 in Case C-282/10 Dominguez v Centre Informatique Du Centre Ouest Atlantique, 
judgment of 24 January 2012, nyr.  
5 House of Lords EU Select Committee, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment’ (HL Paper 62, 
August 2007) paras 5.37–5.41. 
6 G. De Burca and B. Aschenbrenner, 'The Development of European Constitutionalism and the Role 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights' (2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 355, 372. 
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 The article begins by illustrating why the current debates regarding the text 
and scope of the Charter are insufficient in tackling the horizontality question (section 
II). It then discusses why moving away from the old EU horizontality framework is 
necessary in the Charter era (sections III and IV). Finally, before concluding, it goes 
on to set out some of the challenges that need to be addressed in order to develop a 
more coherent horizontal effect model for fundamental rights in the EU, which are 
both constitutional and conceptual (section V).   
 
II. The Charter and horizontal effect: text and scope 
 
As is well known, EU rights derived from primary law have, traditionally, been 
capable of horizontal application.7 Since its entry into legally binding force, the 
Charter has had the status of primary EU law, bearing ‘the same legal value as the 
Treaties’.8 In principle, therefore, it must be capable of being invoked horizontally, 
where a particular provision fulfils the conditions for direct effect.9 However, Article 
51(1) EUCFR states that the Charter applies to the ‘EU institutions and to the 
Member States’ when they are implementing EU law, but makes no mention of 
private parties. For this reason, it has been argued that it cannot create any horizontal 
effects.10 The crux of this argument is that, since Article 51(1) identifies a specific set 
of addressees, it would be impossible for the Court to apply it to interindividual 
disputes without acting beyond the reach of its jurisdiction.11  This would risk 
extending the scope of EU law via the Charter, contrary to Article 51(2) thereof.12 
 The objections to horizontality relating to this provision are nonetheless 
surmountable.13  First of all, Article 51 does not specifically exclude horizontal effect. 
Further, a strict textual approach finds little support in the Court’s practice regarding 
the horizontal effect of the Treaties, especially in respect of fundamental rights. 
Already in Defrenne, the Court was unimpressed by arguments focusing on the 
wording of the provision in question, preferring instead an approach that drew on the 
spirit of the right to equal pay between men and women and maximised its 
effectiveness. It had famously held that:   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Case 43/75, Defrenne v Sabena (No 2) [1976] ECR 455.  
8 Article 6(1) TEU. 
9 As is well known, these conditions are that the provision in question should be clear, unconditional, 
sufficiently precise and not requiring further implementing measures. See Case 26/62, Van Gend en 
Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1.  
10 Trstenjak, n 4 supra, paras 80-83; K. Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 EuConst 375, footnote 11. Cf. C. Ladenburger, FIDE Conference 2012 
Institutional Report, Brussels 2012, available at http://www.fide2012.eu/index.php?doc_id=88, 
accessed 5/03/2014, 34-35. 
11 Trstenjak, n 4 supra, paras 80, 128.  
12 Ibid. Article 51(2) EUCFR provides : ‘This Charter does not extend the field of application of Union 
law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify 
powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.’  
13 See by analogy, P. Craig, ‘Directives, Direct Effect, Indirect Effect and the Construction of National 
Legislation’ (1997) 22 European Law Review 519, 520. The Court has not discussed this issue in its 
recent case law. However, it has indicated that certain provisions may be capable of being applied 
horizontally, suggesting that horizontal effect does fall within the Charter’s scope. See AMS, n 4 supra. 
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The fact that certain provisions […] are formally addressed to the Member 
States does not prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any 
individual who has an interest in the performance of the duties thus laid down. 
[…] In fact, since Article 119 is mandatory in nature, the prohibition on 
discrimination between men and women applies not only in the action of 
public authorities, but also extends to all agreements which are intended to 
regulate paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals.14  
 
 This approach is relevant in the Charter context, as it is supported by clear 
references to the duties of individuals and of the community at large in its Preamble, 
to the effect that ‘enjoyment of these rights entails responsibilities and duties with 
regard to other persons, to the human community and to future generations.’15 
Similarly, it would be difficult to imagine some of the Charter’s provisions which 
reproduce horizontally effective Treaty rights, for instance the right to equal pay 
itself, now enshrined in Article 23 EUCFR, as being stripped of that feature in respect 
of the Charter’s application alone.16 Indeed, to the extent that the Charter applies 
within the scope of EU law, as the Court confirmed in its ruling in Fransson, it is 
inevitable that certain horizontal situations – a core part of EU law to date – will come 
within it as well.17  
 Additionally, there are several Charter provisions which either directly or 
implicitly extend to private conduct. Many of the protections enshrined in titles I-IV 
of the Charter18 are phrased in a manner that guarantees minimum individual rights 
without specifying that they apply to public authorities only. For example, the rights 
to human dignity19 and non-discrimination20 are phrased in a manner that suggests a 
wide-ranging application.21 Further, unlike Article 8 of the European Convention, 
which is limited to the actions of public authorities, the rights to privacy and the 
protection of private data enshrined respectively in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter are 
not restricted to such action and, in conjunction with secondary legislation, do indeed 
create obligations for private parties.22 Finally, provisions such as the protection of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Defrenne II, n 7 supra, paras 31-39; See also Case C-438/05, The international Trasport Workers' 
Federation & The Finnish Seamen's Union v Viking Line. ABP & Oü Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-
10779, paras 58–59. 
15 Charter Preamble, recital 6. 
16 This is now confirmed by the Court’s judgment in AMS, n 4 supra, para 47, which suggests that there 
are distinctions between different Charter rights in respect of horizontality: some rights and, more 
specifically, the Charter’s non-discrimination provision under Article 21 thereof, may give rise to a 
horizontal assessment, to the extent that they are ‘rights-conferring’.  
17 See Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, judgment of 26 February 2013, nyr, para 
44. 
18 These are respectively entitled: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, and Solidarity. 
19 Article 1 EUCFR. 
20 Article 21 EUCFR. 
21 See OJ 303/17, Explanations to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 17 (Art 1), 24 (Article 21, para 
2). 
22 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain, SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 
judgment of 13 May 2014, nyr. 
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human integrity23; the prohibition of slavery and forced labour24; the rights of the 
child25; and the rights that relate to the employment sphere, such as equality between 
women and men26, as well as employee representation and rights at work27, expressly 
include the actions of private parties, at least in addition to the obligations they may 
create for Member States and Union institutions.  
 It follows that the text of Article 51 of the Charter, which regulates its scope 
of application, has limited interpretative value in respect of horizontality. Overall, the 
Charter is phrased in a cryptic way, giving rise to arguments both denying and 
supporting its horizontal effect. A dynamic interpretation is therefore required in 
order to analyse it meaningfully. Indeed, such an interpretation is needed not only in 
order to make sense of the textual difficulties identified above, but also in order to 
reconcile the Charter analysis with the EU horizontality doctrine which had been 
developed prior to the Charter’s entry into force.  
 
III. Towards a historically informed understanding of horizontal effect in EU 
fundamental rights law 
 
In the EU context, fundamental rights have not been defined by the vertical/horizontal 
distinction but, rather, by their use by the Court of Justice as tools for integration via 
all possible avenues: direct and indirect, public and private. While, initially, only few 
Treaty provisions, such as the regulation of competition, were intended to apply to 
private parties28, the Court quickly expanded the concept of horizontal effect in its 
case law.29 Having founded the enforcement of EU law against Member States on a 
wide-ranging culture of directly effective rights for individuals, the CJEU was eager 
to also recognise a corresponding set of EU law duties. In Van Gend en Loos, the 
Court had already used a very telling pairing, that of rights and obligations.30 It was 
not long before the jargon of expectations and, crucially, equality and the balancing of 
competing interests, were transposed to the fundamental rights domain in Defrenne.31 
Indeed, horizontal claims such as those between employer/employee, job-seeker/job-
giver, service provider/service recipient and so on, played an important role in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Article 3 EUCFR and, particularly, Article 3(2) EUCFR concerning the fields of medicine and 
biology.  
24 Article 5 EUCFR. The Explanations confirm that Article 5 was intended to regulate private as well 
as public conduct, at 18-19, most notably in the field of human trafficking. 
25 Article 24 EUCFR and, particlularly, Article 24(2), which concerns action ‘taken by public 
authorities or private institutions’. 
26 Article 23 EUCFR. Notably, this provision relates to ‘all areas, including employment, work and 
pay’ and forms part of Title III Equality, rather than Title IV Solidarity. 
27 Articles 27-28 and 30-33 EUCFR respectively. Despite the fact that these rights address employers 
directly, in the aftermath of the AMS judgment, it is disputable whether the provisions that make 
reference to national laws and practices or indeed any of the Solidarity provisions at all, can be applied 
horizontally. See AMS, n 4 supra, para 49. 
28 Most illustratively, this was the case in the field of competition law. See Articles 85 and 86 TEC, 
subsequently Articles 81 and 82 TEC and, currently, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
29 Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405, para 18. 
30 Van Gend En Loos, n 9 supra. 
31 Defrenne II, n 7 supra. 
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establishment of the internal market and fell well within the scope of the Treaty and 
the Union’s regulatory framework. Thus, horizontal fundamental rights, equally 
structural in EU law as vertical ones32, have certainly played an important part in 
implicating the individual in the Union’s activities not only as a bearer of rights but, 
also, as an actor of whom specific types of conduct are legally required.  
 The fact that EU law accepted the application of rights, including some of the 
rights now listed in the Charter, to private parties, also means that the way this issue is 
tackled today has implications for legal certainty and the conceptual coherence of the 
EU fundamental rights regime. It is therefore important not to treat this as a new 
problem.33 Not only had EU law developed a horizontality doctrine prior to the entry 
into force of the Charter, but that doctrine already suffered from significant 
conceptual problems, which need to be overcome in order to move forward in the 
Charter era. 
 One of the issues that pervade the horizontality debate in the EU, and one 
which needs to be addressed at the outset, is the concept of horizontal effect itself. 
There is no unitary definition of horizontal effect. 34  However, three levels of 
horizontality can generally be identified. Horizontal effect can involve the imposition 
of direct fundamental rights obligations on private parties (‘direct effect’); the indirect 
application of fundamental rights to interindividual disputes through judicial 
interpretation (‘indirect effect’); or the de facto postulation of obligations to private 
parties through obligations formally imposed on the state (‘state-mediated effect’ or, 
to use a term more familiar in this context, ‘positive obligations’).35 Direct horizontal 
effect offers the possibility of bringing a fundamental rights claim under a provision 
of a constitutional statute against another private party.36 Indirect effect and positive 
obligations do not give rise to such claims. Indirect effect enters horizontal disputes 
through the development of legal principles, applied by the courts so that a law 
applicable to private parties is interpreted in the manner that is most favourable to 
fundamental rights.37 When it comes to positive obligations, these do not bind 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 As regards the structural role of fundamental rights in polity-building, see G. Souillac, ‘From Global 
Norms To Local Change: Theoretical Perspectives On The Promotion Of Human Rights In Societies In 
Transition’ in S. Horowitz and A. Schnabel (eds), Human rights and societies in transition: causes, 
consequences, responses (United Nations University Press, 2004) 79. 
33 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, delivered on 18 July 2013 in Case C-176/12, Association de 
Médiation Sociale v Hichem Laboubi, judgment of 15 January 2014, not yet reported, para 34. See 
Defrenne II, n 7 supra, para 39. 
34 See M. De Mol, ‘The Novel Approach of the CJEU on the Horizontal Direct Effect of the EU 
Principle of Non-Discrimination : (Unbridled) Expansionism of EU Law?’ (2011) 18:1-2 Maastricht 
Journal 108, 110. 
35 R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press 2002) 355–356. Further 
subcategories can be discussed, for instance the notion of exclusionary effect, and strong and weak 
forms of indirect horizontality, among others. While these are not necessary for the purposes of this 
discussion, they are masterfully explained in S. Besson, ‘Comment humaniser le droit privé sans 
commodifier les droits de l'homme’ in F. Werro, La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et 
le droit privé (Stämpfli, 2006) 14ff.  
36 Or, equally, of invoking such a provision as a defence in am interindividual dispute. 
37 I avoid the use of the term ‘private law’ here, as in some contexts it can be associated with particular 
types of legislation and not with all law directed at non-state actors, which we are concerned with here.   
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individuals as such. The right is invoked against the state, even though its 
enforcement inevitably affects a horizontal relationship.38  
  For example, in the context of the right not to be discriminated against on 
grounds of health status, such as being HIV-positive, the following claims might be 
available: a) against an employer, requiring that the latter should observe the right 
and/or provide adequate compensation (direct effect); b) in judicial review, requiring 
that a particular statute or legal principle – for instance a law regarding health and 
safety at work or the principle of contractual freedom – be interpreted in a manner 
that accommodates the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of health 
status (indirect effect); and c) against the state, asking for compensation for failure to 
ensure that the right to non-discrimination is observed by private parties, for instance 
by establishing thorough checks or putting in place legislation prohibiting practices 
that discriminate on grounds of health status (positive obligations).39 These three 
manifestations of horizontality are complementary. This is not to say that all 
fundamental rights must be horizontally applied in all three ways at any one time. 
Rather, each of these forms of horizontal effect serves a distinct aspect of the complex 
legal relations that fundamental rights give rise to.40  Direct horizontality binds 
individuals, indirect horizontality binds courts in their interpretation of the law and 
positive obligations bind state authorities.41 The mode in which a right acquires 
horizontal effect depends both on the nature of the right in question, i.e. whether it is 
understood as applicable to private disputes as well as to state-individual disputes and 
on the background against which a particular case is judged.  
 The purpose of this article is not, of course, broadly to describe different 
horizontality claims. The bearing for EU law of this short – perhaps oversimplified – 
overview of fundamental rights horizontality is the following. Despite in principle 
offering recourse to direct and indirect horizontal effect, as well as a type of positive 
obligations, EU law to date has largely failed to reflect the different role that these 
levels of horizontality play in adjudication. For a long time, the horizontal effect 
narrative in the case law has been dominated by a stark discrepancy between the 
horizontal application of fundamental rights enshrined in directives and those 
enshrined in Treaty articles. It is trite EU law that, while Treaty-based rights could 
enjoy direct effect42, ‘a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual 
and [cannot] be relied upon as such against such a person.’43 However, as Craig 
rightly notes, the policy rationale behind this distinction is not self-evident.44 This is 
especially true in respect of the application of horizontal effect to fundamental rights.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See C. O’Cinneide and M. Stelzer, ‘Horizontal effect / state action’ in M. Tushnet, T. Fleiner and C. 
Saunders, Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (Routledge, 2013) 117. 
39 This example is inspired by the set of facts that gave rise to a real case: ECtHR, IB v Greece, Appl. 
No. 552/10, judgment of 3 October 2013.  
40 Alexy, n 35 supra, 485. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Defrenne II, n 7 supra, para 39. 
43 Case C-271/91, Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
(Teaching) [1986] ECR 723, para 48. 
44 P. Craig, ‘The Legal Effect of Directives: Policy, Rules and Exceptions’ (2009) 34 European Law 
Review 349, 355. 
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 Indeed, as the fundamental rights based on the Treaty were generally limited 
and directives were the EU’s main regulatory mechanism for the harmonisation of the 
free movement of workers, including several aspects of employment law and equality, 
the source-based application of horizontality became a particularly problematic rule. 
First, it excluded a number of direct fundamental rights claims from the Court’s 
jurisdiction, generally without providing solid constitutional justifications or 
reasoning.45 Secondly, in order to avoid making unfortunate distinctions in the first 
place, the Court sought ways to circumvent the non-horizontality issue, thus 
compromising on legal certainty.46  
 More specifically, in many of the cases brought before it, the Court chose to 
grant direct horizontal effect by construing the obligation in question either as flowing 
from the Treaty47 or as applying to a state, rather than to a private party, through an 
inflated notion of public bodies.48 Further, in recent years, it has occasionally and 
rather inconsistently resorted to the use of the ‘general principles’ mechanism in order 
to grant direct horizontal effect in non-discrimination cases involving the Equality 
Directive.49 However, the application of this mechanism has been so ad hoc that it is 
difficult to extrapolate from it to make up a clear horizontality exception for all 
fundamental rights questions.50  
 Additionally, where it was impossible to construe the obligation as a direct 
one and, especially, in cases where directives had been disregarded under national 
law, the Court turned to indirect horizontal effect under the national courts’ duty of 
consistent interpretation.51 Yet neither the nature of the right in question nor the 
context to which the right was applied necessarily presented significant differences to 
the cases where direct effect was used. For example, from a fundamental rights 
perspective, it is hard to explain why the right to equal pay between men and women 
(a Treaty-based right) should generate direct horizontal effect against a private 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 This is of course connected with important features of EU law, particularly the idea that fundamental 
rights as general principles should give rise to private law liahility (especially damages) : T. Tridimas, 
The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2006) 29-35. It also stems from an 
important deficiency of EU law, which has not appropriately distinguished the application of public 
law from that of private law and indeed between different types of private law. This is particularly clear 
in relation to the non-discrimination principle, which has continuously been construed as part of the 
market-building process : H. Micklitz, ‘The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law—The 
Transformation of European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and 
Regulation’ (2009) 28:1 Yearbook of European Law 3, 21-22, 44.  
46 Craig, n 13 supra, 527. 
47 See for example: Case C-281/98, Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano [2000] ECR I-04139.  
48 Case C-188/89, Foster v British Gas [1991] ECR I-3313, para 20; For a recent application of Foster 
see: Case C-361/12, Carmela Carratù v Poste Italiane SpA, judgment of 12 December 2013, nyr. 
49 Case C-144/04, Mangold v Helm [2005] ECR I-9981 ; Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci v Swedex [2010] 
IRLR 346. The mechanism has not been followed in Dominguez, n 4 supra, or, more strikingly, in 
AMS, n 4 supra. 
50 See for instance the recent case law in Dominguez, n 4 supra, and AMS, n 4 supra and further 
discussed in section IV infra. 
51 ie an obligation to interpret national law consistently with EU law. Case C-106/89, Marleasing v La 
Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion [1991] 1 ECR 4135; Case 157/86, Murphy and Others v 
Bord Telecom Eireann [1988] ECR 673, para 11; Case C-200/91, Coloroll Pension Trustees Ltd v 
James Richard Russell, Daniel Mangham, Gerald Robert Parker, Robert Sharp, Joan Fuller, Judith 
Ann Broughton and Coloroll Group Plc [1994] ECR I-04389, para 29. 
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employer52, but the, rather similar in nature, right to non-discrimination on grounds of 
gender concerning access to employment (until recently a directive-based right), 
should only result in indirect horizontal effect, if similarly invoked against a private 
employer.53 Substantively, both of these provisions are manifestations of the right to 
equal treatment. While it may be possible to distinguish amongst different aspects of 
equality, and indeed amongst different rights, more thorough explanations as to why 
this is done are required than merely referring to the type of legislation enshrining the 
right or to the status of the party on whom the obligation might fall.54  
 Positive obligations rhetoric has also been greatly absent from the Court’s case 
law in this field, in stark contrast to the ECtHR’s position.55 The Court has mostly 
equated state-mediated forms of horizontality to state liability under the Francovich 
doctrine, in cases where both direct and indirect horizontal effect had failed.56 Indeed, 
EU case law to date has not delineated the scope of the EU and the Member States’ 
liability in respect of fundamental rights, or distinguished it from the obligations of 
private parties, as a matter of principle.57 Guidance is needed though as to when 
positive obligations of the state as opposed to individual obligations arise, at least in 
the field of fundamental rights, where breaches can involve multiple actors, both 
private and public.58 
 It follows that, overtime, the Court did not examine the purposes of the 
fundamental right that was being invoked and whether its institutionalisation as a 
direct horizontal obligation was necessary in light of the goals of that right or the 
reasons for which the Union observes it. It also did not consider ways in which the 
spirit and purport of the obligation could, indirectly, be applied to the dispute in 
question. Rather, its approach seemed to be a mechanical one: while it was eager to 
afford some form of horizontal effect, it only affirmed direct horizontality for 
fundamental rights enshrined in primary law and, where the right was enshrined in 
secondary law, indirect effect/state liability were applied, with no further questions 
asked.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Eg Defrenne II, n 7 supra, para 39. 
53 Eg Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, para 28. It 
must be emphasised that it is not argued here that the application of indirect horizontality in the Court’s 
judgment in Von Colson is incorrect but, rather, that the outright negation of direct horizontal effect for 
directives establishing analogous rights to those established by Treaty articles needs to be reconsidered 
as a matter of principle, in the field of fundamental rights. 
54 See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, delivered on 9 February 1994 in Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori 
v Recreb  [1994] ECR 1-3325, para 51; Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, delivered on 27 January 
1994 in Case C-316/93, Vaneetveld v SA Le Foyer [1994] ECR 1-763, para 29; Craig (n 13) 536-7. 
55 Indeed, the ECtHR has substantially expanded the reach of the positive obligations doctrine: see, for 
a recent example, IB v Greece, n 39 supra. 
56 Case C-6/90, Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991] ECR I-5375, paras 31-35; for a recent example 
of this assessment, see AMS, n 4 supra, para 50.  
57 The View of Advocate General Jääskinen, delivered on 22 September 2010 in Case 400/10 PPU, J. 
McB. v L. E [2010] ECR I-08965, did contain a discussion of this issue in relation to the right to family 
life (paras 68–69). The Court did not however discuss this in its judgment. See also the Opinion of 
Advocate General Jacobs, delivered on 11 July 2002 in Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v Austria [2003] 
ECR I‑5659, para 102. 
58 See further : O. De Schutter, ‘The Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights through 
the Open Method of Coordination’ (2004) NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 07/04, 16, 19-21. 
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 The treatment of indirect effect and positive obligations as fall-back 
measures,59 applicable only when direct effect could not be established, rendered the 
EU horizontality doctrine particularly one-dimensional, and resulted in a failure to 
discuss the appropriateness of the remedies offered by each of its different 
expressions, as alternatives.60 Furthermore, the different rules developed overtime in 
the case law were applied erratically in the fundamental rights sphere, so that it is 
difficult to map out a consistent judicial practice in this field. While some general 
themes can be identified, these are neither conducive to legal certainty nor revealing 
of a clear agenda for the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in Union law. 61  
 Thus, perhaps due to the fact that the horizontality doctrine did not concern 
fundamental rights alone, but rather all provisions of EU law, its application started 
lacking, over the years, the rights-oriented reasoning that resounded in the Defrenne 
approach. Overall, the doctrine appears to have been shaped so as to ensure the 
observance of Union law in all of its fields of application, safeguarding its 
effectiveness, uniformity, and primacy.62 It did not however make specific provision 
for fundamental rights issues qua questions of constitutional character. An 
unsatisfactory and much-criticised state of affairs therefore preceded the Charter’s 
entry into force.63 Indeed, there was a significant mismatch between the horizontal 
effect doctrine described earlier – a tiered mechanism geared towards ensuring the 
application of fundamental rights across a constitutional order – and the functional, 
case-specific approach that underpinned horizontal effect in EU law.  
 This application of horizontal effect to fundamental rights stands in stark 
contrast to the constitutionalising effects of the Charter, which extend to all of its 
provisions, irrespective of whether they are Treaty-based or directive-based. 64 
Further, the adjudication of horizontal fundamental rights raises important substantive 
concerns. Disagreement regarding the application of these rights is sensitive, in light 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Marleasing, n 51 supra, para 8; Case C-213/89, The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, Ex 
Parte Factortame Limited and Others [1990] ECR I-2433, para 19. 
60 T. Tridimas, ‘Horizontal Direct Effect of Directives: a Missed Opportunity?’ (1994) 19 European 
Law Review 621, 635-636. 
61 Craig (n 13) 527; See also: T. Tridimas, ‘Black White and Shades of Grey: Horizontality of 
Directives Revisited’ (2002) 21 Yearbook of European Law 327, 327; Editorial note, ‘Horizontal direct 
effect – A law of diminishing coherence?’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1, 2. 
62 N. Ferreira and others, ‘The Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in European 
Union Law’ in G. Brüggemeier and others (eds), Fundamental rights and private law in the European 
Union, vol 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 33-34; Vaneetveld Opinion, n 54 supra, para 29; See 
also S. Drake, ‘Twenty years after Von Colson: the impact of "indirect effect" on the protection of the 
individual's community rights’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 329. 
63 See, illustratively: Craig (n 13); Tridimas (n 60); S. Prechal, Directives in European Community 
Law: A Study of Directives and Their Enforcement in National Courts (Clarendon Press, 1995) chapter 
5; D. Kinley, ‘Direct Effect of Directives: Stuck on Vertical Hold’ (1995) 1 European Public Law 79; 
R. Mastroianni,‘On the Distinction Between Vertical and Horizontal Effects of Community Directives: 
What Role for the Principle of Equality?’ (1999) 5 European Public Law 417. 
64 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, delivered on 19 May 2011, in Case C-447/09 Prigge 
and Others v Deutsche Lufthansa, judgment of 13 September 2011, nyr, para 26; See also: J. Kokott 
and C. Sobotta, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union After Lisbon’, EUI 
Working Paper 2010/6, 6, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/15208 [last accessed 29 June 
2014]. 
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of the central role that fundamental rights play in post-war EU constitutional orders.65 
Additionally, their impact on the parties involved, who are often in precarious 
positions, requires particularly careful assessment.66 The pre-Lisbon horizontality 
doctrine does not give rise to an adequate conceptual framework, which can serve as a 
starting point for addressing these issues with clarity as they start resurfacing in the 
Charter era.  
 
IV. Horizontal effect and the Charter: old problems, (no) new responses?     
 
The Charter’s primary law status heightens the constitutional value of rights in the EU 
legal order.67 It codifies the fundamental rights commitments of an EU polity and 
creates the potential of invoking entitlements premised on an – at least minimally – 
common conception of the Union’s objectives and values.68 It thus goes beyond mere 
aspirations for a common constitutional framework and creates a concrete basis for 
the invocation of a set of rights as conditions upon which the EU political community, 
comprising supranational institutions, national structures, and private parties, is 
founded. As such, as Advocate General Cruz Villalón put it in Prigge, there is now a 
question as to whether the source-based case law of the pre-Lisbon years must be 
reassessed altogether, in light of the fact that fundamental rights have ‘been enshrined 
in the “Lisbon Charter” and it is therefore from this source that the possibilities and 
limitations of [their] usefulness must flow’.69  
 So far, the Court of Justice has not tackled this question. Instead, it has revived 
the principles set out in its prior case law, risking an extension of its deficiencies to 
the Charter era. This was made particularly clear in the AMS judgment.70 The case 
concerned Article 27 EUCFR, which provides that ‘workers or their representatives 
must, at the appropriate levels, be guaranteed information and consultation in good 
time in the cases and under the conditions provided for by Union law and national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Most strikingly of course, in Germany : Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft, 2 BvR 197/83, 22 October 
1986 (Solange II) ; and in the UK : Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), 
para 62 (per Laws LJ). 
66 It is noteworthy that vulnerability is increasingly a factor that is considered relevant in human rights 
law and, especially, in the ECtHR context, on which EU law is heavily reliant: See L. Peroni and A. 
Timmer, ‘Vulnerable Groups: The Promise Of An Emerging Concept In European Human Rights 
Convention Law’ (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1056.  
67 Kokott and Sobotta, n 64 supra, 6. 
68 The Charter’s Preamble makes clear, for instance, that the Charter is based on the values of dignity, 
freedom, equality and solidarity and the principles of democracy and the rule of law. 
69 Prigge Opinion, n 64 supra, para 26. 
70 AMS, cited n 4 supra. For a more detailed assessment of this case, see E. Frantziou, ‘Case C-176/12 
Association de Médiation Sociale: Some Reflections on the Horizontal Effect of the Charter and the 
Reach of Fundamental Employment Rights in the European Union’ (2014) 10 European Constitutional 
Law Review 332 ; N. Lazzerini, ‘Case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des 
syndicats CGT and Others, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 15 January 2014’ 
(2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 907 ; C. Murphy, ‘Using the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights Against Private Parties after Association De Médiation Sociale’ (2014) European Human Rights 
Law Review 170; E. Uría Gavilán, ‘¿Los principios de la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión 
Europea pueden ser invocados en litigios entre particulares?: comentario a la Sentencia del Tribunal de 
Justicia (gran sala) de 15 de enero de 2014 en el Asunto C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale’ 
(2014) 34 Revista General de Derecho Europeo (RI §415166). 
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laws and practices.’ This right is further enshrined in Directive 2002/14, which 
establishes a general framework for informing and consulting employees within the 
EU.71 In implementing this directive, France had excluded employees working under 
certain types of contracts, including accompanied-employment contracts, from the 
right in question. AMS, an association governed by private law mainly employing 
individuals through such contracts, brought a case challenging the creation of a works 
council by its employees. The questions referred by the French court to the CJEU 
mainly concerned the horizontal applicability of Article 27, as expressed in Directive 
2002/14. 
 Rather than discussing the purpose of Article 27, the scope of the protection it 
actually affords, and the reasons for its incorporation in the EU Charter, the Court 
restated its case law on the non-horizontality of directives and noted that indirect 
effect (qua consistent interpretation) was inapplicable in this case, as it would amount 
to a contra legem reading of national law.72 It then confined its interpretation to a 
cursory reading of the Charter’s text, finding that this provision did not create a right 
specific enough to be directly invoked as such in a dispute between private parties.73 
The Court did not go on to discuss the Charter’s potential for horizontal applicability 
in the future, limiting its assessment to a discussion of the relevant directive.74  
 However, this approach prevented it from embarking on a much-needed 
interpretation of the content of the right in question, building on its social and legal 
context and the kind of goals it serves.75 The Court’s reasoning is unconvincing in the 
absence of such a discussion, especially when compared to judgments in which 
horizontality has previously been granted, such as Mangold and Kücükdeveci.76 There 
were substantial similarities between these cases, which seemed to be pushed to one 
side, adding to legal uncertainty in this field. Further, the singling out of Article 27 
and its specific expression in Directive 2002/14 is an alarming development in respect 
of the Charter’s horizontality. Fundamental rights claims such as that to information 
and consultation within the undertaking are difficult to discuss without having regard 
to broader questions concerning the viability of a state-based approach in their 
effective protection, as well as the vulnerability of those claiming them and equality 
of treatment, in this case between different groups of workers.77 The case thus 
provides an excellent illustration of the difficulties inherent in applying horizontality 
through technical rules in the fundamental rights domain: these rights do not operate 
in a contextual vacuum; they engage a web of commitments within a social setting, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 OJ L 80/29, 23.3.2002, Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European 
Community - Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 
employee representation, Article 1(1). 
72 AMS, n 4 supra, paras 39-40. 
73 Ibid, para 51. 
74 It must however be noted that the Court did leave the door open for horizontal effect in respect of 
Article 21: AMS, n 4 supra, para 47. 
75 Frantziou ‘Case C-176/12’, n 70 supra, 346-7. 
76 See AMS, n 4 supra, especially paras 39-49. 
77 Professor S. Sciarra persuasively made the latter point at a symposium concerning the AMS 
judgment, which was held at University College London on 11 February 2014.  
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this case that of employment, which is characterised by a plurality of bargaining 
positions and by diachronically significant contestations of authority. The Court’s 
treatment of the Charter provision as if it were separate to these issues and the 
unquestioned application of technical distinctions drawn from prior case law to the 
Charter, without an assessment of its specificities, are puzzling.78  
 At the same time, the Court’s conservative analysis of horizontality is not 
underpinned by a conceptual commitment to applying the Charter vertically, i.e. to 
Member States and Union institutions alone. Rather, the Court is open to the creation 
of obligations in practice for (at least some) private parties, such as powerful search 
engine operators, in respect of (some) Charter rights, such as privacy.79 Horizontal 
obligations flowing from the Charter are thus still attributed to private entities in the 
case law, even though the horizontality question is not openly examined. This is 
problematic: it can lead to an informal and unpredictable horizontality model, which 
is an important legal hurdle for private parties to whom obligations are imposed, 
while in turn offers little more than an uncertain prospect for parties seeking to have 
those obligations imposed on others. This is all the more true to the extent that the 
cases in which the Court makes reference to horizontal effect remain the exception to 
a rule of altogether avoiding discussions of this issue.80 
 To summarise: it is clear that, in assessing the Charter’s horizontality, it is 
important to have regard to the way in which EU law has developed. Detached from 
this context, it is unfruitful to discuss either the arguments in favour of horizontal 
effect today or the arguments against it, as the rich history of horizontality in EU law 
inevitably affects them both. In the absence of horizontal effect for the Charter, a 
chasm in the degree of protection afforded by the Court to individuals pre-Lisbon and 
post-Lisbon would be created. Striving for coherence in developing the EU 
fundamental rights regime would be beneficial: if fundamental rights are to remain 
one of the building blocks of the developing EU polity, as both Article 2 TEU and the 
constitutionalisation of the Charter suggest, then it is necessary to be clear about what 
these fundamental rights obligations entail, who is affected by them, and in what 
manner. Nonetheless, as this article has tried to illustrate so far, this cannot be done 
by relying lock, stock and barrel on an overcomplicated and, at times, directly 
contradictory set of rules. Rather, it is necessary to think more carefully about how 
these rules can apply to the more formal fundamental rights framework created by the 
Charter, and, most importantly, whether there are good enough reasons for 
maintaining horizontal effect in the first place.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Frantziou ‘Case C-176/12’, n 70 supra, 347. 
79 Google, n 22 supra; See also Case C-476/11, HK Danmark v Experian, judgment of 26 September 
2013, not yet reported, paras 19-21. 
80 See L. Pech, ‘Between judicial minimalism and avoidance: the Court of Justice's sidestepping of 
fundamental constitutional issues in Römer and Dominguez’ (2012) 50 Common Market Law Review 
1841; M. De Mol, ‘Dominguez : A Deafeninng Silence’ (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review 
280. Most illustratively in the case law, Dominguez, n 4 supra; Case C-132/11 Tyrolean Air, judgment 
of 7 June 2012, nyr; HK Danmark, ibid; Case C-104/09 Roca Álvarez v Sesa Start España ETT SA 
[2010] ECR I-08661; Case C-429/12 Pohl v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG, judgment of 16 January 2014, nyr. 
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 In part, this question involves a thorough engagement with the problems of the 
previous horizontality model. In part, it is also a forward-looking exercise, which 
concerns the way in which we understand fundamental rights and why we chose to 
protect them at the EU level. In addition to the difficult task of rebuilding coherence 
in the Court’s horizontality case law, granting horizontal effect to the Charter 
therefore gives rise to an equally difficult question regarding the desirability of 
extending a rights model traditionally applicable to states to private parties, which 
cannot be overlooked, even in the deeply ingrained horizontality model of the 
European Union.  
 
V. Rediscovering horizontality: addressing challenges and finding reasons 
 
The overview of the history of horizontal effect in EU law provided in earlier sections 
has demonstrated that, while the Court of Justice subscribed to a form of horizontality 
from early on, it never truly engaged with the conceptual dilemmas arising in the 
fundamental rights arena. There are important objections to horizontal effect however, 
which should not be underestimated. Some relate to the Union’s complex, pluralist 
constitutional makeup and the difficulties involved in applying rights horizontally in 
some of the constitutional orders that comprise it; some challenges relate to the 
application of rights within the EU’s own legal order; and some go even further: they 
relate to the question of whether rights should create obligations towards everyone in 
the first place.  
 
A. Constitutional challenges 
 
Horizontality in the fundamental rights context, as prescribed by a regional bill of 
rights, is a particularly sensitive matter, to which there are no easy – or indeed 
exclusively legal – answers.81 It is clear that different legal systems globally use the 
horizontality doctrine in substantially different ways.82 Crucially, horizontal effect is 
also applied asymmetrically by EU Member States in their national constitutions and, 
while some constitutional orders have a strong horizontality tradition, in others it is 
still an evolving concept. For instance, in the United Kingdom, there is a long-
standing debate on this subject, in respect of the Human Rights Act.83 By contrast, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See Ladenburger, n 9 supra, 2. 
82 For example, in South Africa it is possible to claim, under certain circumstances, constitutional rights 
directly against private parties, under Article 8(2) of the Bill of Rights. See also: Case CCT 53/01, 
Khumalo v Holomisa, 14 July 2002, O’Reagan J, para 33. Cf Case CCT 8/95, Du Plessis v De Klerk, 7 
November 1995, Kentridge AJ, paras 45-62. By contrast, in the United States horizontal effect is only 
applied through protective duties falling on courts qua state authorities: Shelley v Kraemer 334 US 1 
(1948), para 17; horizontality in the US context is arguably developing away from strict conceptions of 
state-mediated effect. See, in that regard: S. Gardbaum, ‘The 'Horizontal Effect' of Constitutional 
Rights’ (2003) UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 03-14, available at 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.437440>, 40, accessed 04/12/2013. 
83 See G. Phillipson and A. Williams, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint’ (2011) 
74(6) Modern Law Review 878, 878-879; W Wade, ‘Horizons of horizontality’ (2000) 116 Law 
Quarterly Review 217; J. Morgan, ‘Questioning the “true effect” of the Human Rights Act’ (2002) 22 
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Germany, an established indirect horizontality model (Drittwirkung or ‘third party 
effect’) is in place. The Federal Constitutional Court has a broad duty of ensuring that 
all law is applied in accordance with an ‘objective order’ (objective Wertordnung) of 
constitutional law principles, which are inviolable in both public and private law 
proceedings.84 While the German model has been particularly influential in other EU 
Member States85, it is not universal. For example, the Irish Constitution has been 
interpreted as being horizontally directly effective, where this construction is 
possible.86 A further layer of complexity is added to this picture by the regional 
human rights jurisdiction of the European Convention on Human Rights. As is well 
known, while the ECHR system of individual applications is restricted to claims 
against contracting states, a broad construction of the positive obligations doctrine is 
employed to ensure the Convention’s application in cases where the violation stems 
from the actions of private parties.87  
 All of these elements influence the horizontal application of rights in the EU.  
The story of fundamental rights in Europe is not a story of EU rights only but, rather, 
an integrated and complex system of multiple levels of protection that have developed 
relationally over several years.88 In this vein, the Charter contains EU rights which are 
also constitutionally protected in the Member States and some of which are further 
enshrined in the ECHR.89 Its application thus raises questions of compatibility with a 
range of fundamental rights standards, both at the national and at the international 
level.  
 A lot of fine-tuning remains to be done as regards the interaction of the 
Charter with the ECHR in respect of horizontality. While the Charter can offer more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Legal Studies 259, 260–261; S. Pattinson and D. Beyleveld,‘Horizontal applicability and horizontal 
effect’ (2002) 118 Law Quarterly Review 623, 664; M. Hunt,‘The “horizontal effect” of the Human 
Rights Act’ (1998) Public Law 423. More recently, the question appears to have been settled in favour 
of horizontal effect though, in a case involving discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation: Bull v 
Hall and Preddy [2013] UKSC 73. 
84 BVerfGE 7, 198 – Lüth, 205. 
85 See for example the case of Estonia: T. Kerikmäe, ‘EU Charter: Its Nature, Innovative Character, 
and Horizontal Effect’ in Kerikmäe (ed), Protecting Human Rights In The EU: Controversies And 
Challenges Of The Charter Of Fundamental Rights (Springer, 2013) 14-16; or Denmark: J. 
Christoffersen, ‘Denmark: Drittwirkung and Constitutional Rights – Viewed from National and 
International Perspectives’ in D. Oliver and J. Fedtke (eds) Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A 
Comparative Study (Routledge, 2007) 27. 
86Murtagh Properties v Cleary [1972] IR 330.  
87 See, illustratively: ECtHR, Airey v Ireland, Appl. No. 6289/73, judgment of 9 October 1979; 
ECtHR, Plattform “Ärzte Für Das Leben” v Austria, Appl. No 1012682, judgment of 21 June 1988; 
ECtHR, Osman v United Kingdom, Appl. No. 2345294, judgment of 28 October 1998; and IB v Greece 
(n 39); D. Spielmann, L’effet Potentiel de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’homme entre 
Personnes Privées (Bruylant, 1996).  
88 P. Eeckhout, ‘Human Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law: Pluralism or Integration?’ (2013) 66 
Current Legal Problems 169, 171–172; L. Besselink, ‘General Report. The Protection of Fundamental 
Rights Post-Lisbon: The Interaction Between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, the European Convention on Human Rights and National Constitutions’ (XXV FIDE Congress, 
Tallinn, 30 May - 02 June 2012) 47. 
89 Irrespective of whether the Union eventually accedes to the Convention, any incompatibilities with 
the Convention’s interpretation of rights under the Charter would be problematic under both Articles 
52(3) and 53 EUCFR, in addition to the conflicting claims they would create for the Member States, all 
of which are signatories of the Convention.  
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extensive protection than the Convention90, it should not be simply assumed that 
allowing horizontal claims of any kind will be compatible with ECHR standards. 
Direct horizontality in particular often involves balancing between competing rights, 
so that a thorough review of whether minimum standards are reached for all affected 
rights will need to be carried out, in order to ensure compliance with the Convention. 
This is likely to be a complicated affair, requiring further dialogue between the 
Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts, especially in respect of newer rights. For 
example, horizontal balancing between the protections of privacy and data protection 
enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and the freedom of expression and 
information enshrined in Article 11 thereof is a case in point. 91 While the EU may 
allow – and indeed require – the imposition of obligations to protect privacy and 
private data on non-state actors, the Convention system is more restrictive in this 
regard, due to its primarily state-oriented construction. Further, the Strasbourg Court 
has traditionally placed significant emphasis on the right to freedom of expression, 
which is often raised as a counter-claim in intersubjective disputes in this field, yet 
this right appears to feature less prominently in the case law of the Court of Justice.92 
Where the balance is struck will naturally be a point of contention in cases in which 
rights compete. 
 Similarly, ascribing wide-ranging horizontal effect to fundamental rights 
through the Charter risks significantly upsetting domestic constitutional choices. It is 
likely to be a particularly divisive issue for those Member States that have limited or 
very deeply rooted horizontal effect regimes, to the extent that it involves potential 
constitutional changes, at least in respect of the situations that come within the scope 
of EU law. In light of the fact that there is no common EU stance in this field, a fully 
conceptualised horizontality model for fundamental rights – especially if it is one that 
includes direct horizontal effect – is likely to be met with resistance at the domestic 
level.93 This concern lurks between the lines in the Court’s post-Charter case law, 
most notably in respect of rights protected under the Solidarity chapter, such as 
information and consultation within the undertaking in AMS or paid annual leave in 
Dominguez.94  The unwillingness to accord horizontal effect to these provisions may 
not be squarely justified in legal terms, as I have indicated above, but it can perhaps 
be understood in light of the political contestability of horizontal effect, especially as 
regards the Charter’s Solidarity chapter. 95  Disagreements on whether Solidarity 
provisions should be capable of invocation in the same way as other provisions were 
abundant during the Charter’s drafting, so that their horizontal application could be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Article 52(3) EUCFR. 
91 E. Frantziou, ‘Further developments in the right to be forgotten: The European Court’s judgment in 
Case C-131/12, Google Spain, SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos’ (2014) 14 
Human Rights Law Review 761, 772-775.  
92 Ibid.  
93 See Solange II, n 65 supra. 
94 n 4 supra. 
95 For an insight into the political debate concerning the incorporation of Solidarity provisions during 
the Charter’s drafting, see: Lord Goldsmith Q.C., ‘A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles’ 
(2001) 38:5 Common Market Law Review 1201, 1212-1213.	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perceived as an open conflict with some Member States, and particularly those that 
signed Protocol 30.96 
  While one might easily concede that horizontal effect can have an impact on 
both Member State - EU relations and on the EU’s outlook towards fundamental 
rights protection internationally, the question of how the Court can manage this is 
more difficult. To date, the Court of Justice has not addressed these elaborate 
constitutional aspects of the horizontal application of rights openly. Rather, 
constitutional reasoning has emphatically been absent from the case law before, as 
well as after the Lisbon Treaty, despite its clear echoes in recent Opinions of 
Advocates General.97 To a great extent, this could be attributed to the very nature of 
the preliminary reference procedure, as it has made it possible to focus on sub-issues 
and particularities of the case at hand without advancing broader, framework-building 
reasoning. In this sense, the individual ‘rights and obligations’ approach to horizontal 
effect that can be traced back to Van Gend en Loos, despite having provided a starting 
point for horizontal claims in the EU, has ironically also created a structural hurdle for 
developing a conceptually sound horizontal effect model for fundamental rights. In 
particular, as Joseph Weiler has recently put it, the existing EU rights framework  
always posits an individual vindicating a personal, private interest against the 
[…] public good. That is why it works, that is part of its genius, but that is also 
why this wonderful value also constitutes another building block in that 
construct which places the individual in the center but turns him into a self-
centered individual.98  
 Building on this observation, two main points can be made. Firstly, it is 
necessary to resist minimalist judgments superficially shielded by the case-specific 
nature of the EU’s application of rights to date.99 While the Court may not be in a 
position to tackle broad constitutional issues altogether in cases factually focusing on 
a particular individual interest, it is not impossible to create a judicial discourse that 
acknowledges (and in part responds to) the underlying questions, through a clearer 
explication of the reasons for the course eventually followed. Indeed, it is important to 
emphasise in this regard that, to the extent that the Court of Justice is posited as the 
final arbiter on the interpretation of the Charter, its rulings provide guidance regarding 
its interaction with national constitutional practices, also in the field of horizontal 
effect. This is crucial for lower national courts, for which the horizontal effect of 
Charter rights has until now remained an issue mandating a reference to their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Ibid. 
97 See, most illustratively, the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalon in AMS, n 33 supra; and the 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Roca Álvarez, n 80 supra, para 55. 
98 JHH Weiler, ‘The individual as subject and object and the dilemma of European legitimacy’ (2014) 
12:1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 94, 103. 
99 A thorough account of minimalism in fundamental rights cases is provided in: D. Sarmiento, ‘Half a 
Case at a Time: Dealing with Judicial Minimalism at the European Court of Justice’ in M. Claes and 
others (eds) Constitutional conversations in Europe: actors, topics and procedures (Intersentia, 2012) 
13. 
	   18	  
constitutional counterparts.100 Similarly, it is important for individual claimants, who 
must be able to plan their lives ‘cognisant of the legal consequences of their 
actions’.101  
 Secondly, there is an in-principle objection to tackling the horizontality 
question as one that pertains to individual rights and obligations only. Irrespective of 
how a specific claim reaches the Court, horizontality in the fundamental rights sphere 
cannot be equated to the affirmation of individual interests alone. Fundamental rights 
also safeguard – and can be justified by reference to – collective goods.102 Societal 
goals as well as questions of exclusion and otherness feed directly into the 
fundamental rights paradigm and its horizontal application is only logically coherent 
on this basis. The right to assert rights against others and the obligation in turn to 
observe the rights of others presuppose society, even of a post-national kind, and an 
assessment of what responsibility means within it. Horizontality is thus founded upon 
an understanding of the individual qua socially encumbered, private-and-public being.  
 This leads me into the final part of my assessment of horizontal effect, which 
advances the following tentative argument. In addition to placing the Charter’s 
horizontality in its constitutional context, namely European, national and international 
rights protection, the EU horizontality narrative in this field – shaped both by judicial 
and academic discourse – must be supplemented by a more thorough engagement 
with concepts central to the horizontal application of fundamental rights in society, 
such as private power, individual autonomy and human dignity.103  
 
B. Engaging with the conceptual foundations of horizontal effect and its social impact 
 
In addition to constitutional concerns relating to the EU fundamental rights regime, 
the very question of whether fundamental rights should apply to private parties is far 
from settled. As demonstrated in section III above, the EU horizontality doctrine has 
so far applied to all provisions of EU law, rather than to fundamental rights in 
particular, so that its impact has not been examined in depth, from the fundamental 
rights angle. This is to some extent understandable: as noted earlier, the evolution of 
the rights we have now come to regard as fundamental has in large part been 
indistinguishable from the broader EU system, in which individual rights 
(fundamental or not) played a vital role in the application of the law.104 However, 
both in order to determine the reasons for applying rights horizontally and in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 See for example, in the UK, Benkharbouche v Embassy Of The Republic Of Sudan [2014] ICR 169. 
Uneasy about how to interpret the Court’s case law, the EAT felt it was necessary to refer the point to 
the Court of Appeal, before which the case is currently pending. 
101 Craig, n. supra, 354 ; Vaneetveld Opinion, n supra, para 31. 
102 R. Alexy, ‘Individual Rights and Collective Goods’ in C. S. Nino (ed), Rights (NYU Press 1992) 
163, 164-165. 
103 It must be noted that Advocate General Cruz Villalon, has made important leaps in this direction, in 
a series of his recent Opinions, most notably : AMS Opinion, n 33 supra and Opinion of Advocate 
General Cruz Villalon, delivered on 22 May 2014 in Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v Vandersteen, not yet 
reported. 
104 See Weiler, n 98 supra. 
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identify the right way(s) of doing so, a more focused discussion of the impact of 
horizontal effect on fundamental rights is required.  
 The creation of a binding Charter does not only remove some of the 
uncertainty that has naturally surrounded the concept of fundamental rights in the 
European Union, but also places an obligation on the Court to observe and to apply 
them based on some kind of principled system. This raises two substantive questions 
in respect of horizontal effect: first, should fundamental rights apply horizontally? 
Second, if fundamental rights should be so applied, where can their limits be drawn? 
Of course, these questions are of an order that cannot be discussed exhaustively here. 
I will therefore confine my analysis to highlighting some of the issues that are, in my 
view, most useful in rediscovering a horizontal effect doctrine that is more closely 
tailored to fundamental rights protection. Ultimately though, the questions will be left 
open for further discussion, assessment and revision.  
 
i. Should rights apply horizontally and, if so, why? 
 
Fundamental rights are traditionally considered to be applicable to states.105 While 
there has been a move towards greater protection against fundamental rights 
violations by non-state actors internationally106, the extension of these rights to 
private parties broadly can be considered as being incompatible with western liberal 
systems of rights protection, which are constructed around the concepts of state 
authority and individual autonomy, largely to the exclusion of private forms of 
authority.107 Andrew Clapham succinctly notes: it is often argued that ‘an application 
of human rights obligations to non-state actors trivialises, dilutes and distracts from 
the great concept of human rights [and that] such an application bestows inappropriate 
power and legitimacy on such actors.’108 One of the main concerns inherent in this 
view is that horizontal effect could eventually reduce fundamental rights to ordinary 
private law claims, thus removing their symbolic value and the normative superiority 
that they possess constitutionally. 109  Finally, as current fundamental rights 
frameworks are not designed to apply horizontally, courts can rely on little more than 
intuition in applying them to private parties.110  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 C. Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford University Press, 2003) 84; 
L. Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) 53.  
106 See, for example : UN Commission on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: 
Human Rights and Human Responsibilities, Annex I, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/105 (2003); Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003); A. Brysk, Human Rights and Private Wrongs: Constructing 
Global Civil Society (Routledge, 2005) 125. 
107 See A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
438; Brysk, ibid, 23. 
108 Clapham, ibid, 58. 
109 M. Tushnet, ‘The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional Law’ 
(2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 79, 93  
110 A. Barak, ‘Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law’ in D. Friedmann and D. Barak-Erez 
(eds), Human Rights in Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2001) 17. 
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 All of these considerations are important and can become difficult to address, 
in the absence of a common stance vis-à-vis the justifications of horizontal effect in 
this field in the EU. Nonetheless, a horizontality doctrine applied in a manner that is 
sensitive to the goals of the protected right can still have concrete benefits – not only 
in terms of the effective and uniform application of EU law (incidentally also in 
respect of fundamental rights) – but more concretely, in terms of social inclusion, 
welfare and, ultimately, equality.  
 The horizontal effect of fundamental rights can be conceptualised as a tool to 
respond to broader new phenomena in which the EU and its Member States are 
inevitably involved: contemporary developments such as globalisation, the 
privatisation of public functions, and legal fragmentation, clearly point towards an 
extension of some obligations to private actors.111 Some private parties, such as large 
multinational corporations, paramilitary groups and religious institutions are 
increasingly accumulating power equivalent to that of states.112 But, even outside of 
the state-like framework, it is becoming clearer that, in a society in which we have to 
live with others, each individual ‘I’ is not a strictly private thing.113 The traditionally 
‘private’ domain – perhaps most importantly of all, the home – is far from immune to 
violations of fundamental rights.114 State-centric fundamental rights have important 
deficiencies in respect of effective enforcement for some groups of potential 
claimants, such as those who are mainly homebound (for instance homemakers, 
children, or the elderly), and people in conditions of displacement (such as irregular 
migrants or the homeless), who often have few avenues to report fundamental rights 
violations.115 Furthermore, the state-centric approach to rights presents important 
problems, if we come to accept as fundamental rights a broader set of rights to basic 
goods, which are ‘essential to a minimally worthwhile human life’.116 Today, we can 
hardly avoid dealing with other private parties, such as an employer, an Internet 
search engine, a private hospital, or an electricity provider. These entities can have an 
undeniable impact on our access to basic rights, such as pay, privacy, healthcare, or 
safe housing.117  
 As such, a discussion of the horizontal effect of rights involves a deeper 
inquiry into the kind of society the EU is setting itself out to be and the values that lie 	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115 See C. MacKinnon, Toward a feminist theory of the state (Harvard University Press, 1989) 163. 
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Journal of Social Philosophy 542, 553; see also V. Mantouvalou, ‘In Support of Legalisation’ in C. 
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H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, And U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press, 
1996) 52. 
117 Several provisions concerning all of these basic rights are included in the Charter.   
	   21	  
in its core: if the values are those of a laissez-faire market economy concerned 
primarily with advancing the interests of its participants, then horizontal effect is 
perhaps unwarranted in the fundamental rights context. As I have indicated in earlier 
sections, the case law does not reflect a clear stance on this matter. 118 At the same 
time though, it is also important to recognise that, from early on, EU fundamental 
rights have had a radical, inclusionary impact, affecting individuals not otherwise 
engaged in cross-border activities. 119  A concern for basic entitlements, and an 
acknowledgement of the role of private actors in bringing them about, have also been 
important in regulating the Union’s market-centric public sphere and have secured a 
degree of substantive equality therein, manifested most clearly in the affirmation of 
the rights of women120, pregnant workers121, and carers.122  
 Thus, while the broader impact of horizontal fundamental rights has routinely 
been left outside of the EU discourse, the possibility of invoking rights horizontally in 
the European Union is, in fact, particularly well-placed in terms of institutionally 
protecting claimants in precarious situations. To some extent, these issues can be 
located within EU law already. Equal treatment and working conditions have been 
traditional forums for the application of horizontal effect, in both its direct and its 
indirect manifestations. Other rights, such as the rights of children123, families124 and 
the elderly125 may be newer features of EU law, traceable more clearly in the Charter, 
but they confirm that the position of these groups within society needs to be taken into 
account in applying fundamental rights in the EU in the future. Indeed, considerations 
pertaining to structural inequalities, capability creation and social justice are 
embedded in the Charter, which unusually incorporates rights to education, work, 
access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and many more.126 In 
assessing the horizontal effect of the Charter’s provisions, it is possible to look back 
and to emphasise this, socially awakening aspect of fundamental rights in EU law.127 
 While this may not be the only justification for horizontal effect, it is a 	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prominent consideration, which has not been accounted for duly in recent years. After 
all, in determining whether horizontal obligations should be imposed, as well as who 
should be bound by them, it is important not to lose sight of what these claims can 
mean for people’s lives: seeing one’s child; being able to work free from 
discrimination; receiving a pension, to mention but a few. A meaningful answer as to 
when and why horizontality is required in this field must take account of these things 
and how much a particular society values them. It thus involves a thorough 
assessment - and a continuous process of reassessing - of the circumstances under 
which human beings interact with each other in their private relations and the ways in 
which the law reaches out to them in their different conditions.  
   
ii. When should rights apply horizontally? 
 
It does not suffice merely to acknowledge that a degree of horizontality is needed in 
order to accommodate fundamental rights in a modern social setting. Important 
choices will also need to be made as to what standards we apply to penalise private 
breaches of fundamental rights and what kind of private actions give rise to such 
breaches in the first place. This exercise goes to the heart of a renewed commitment 
to horizontal effect, especially in the EU, where the imposition of obligations has not, 
so far, followed clear standards as regards the attribution of responsibility. Should all 
private relations be considered as potentially subject to a horizontality formula and, if 
so, what limits could be drawn to define it? For instance, are we to understand, per 
Brysk, the ‘private authority relationship’ as the external normative standard?128 Or is 
it more appropriate to utilise principles such as dignity as the conceptual foundation 
of horizontality in the field of fundamental rights, delineating the relevant obligations 
based on the nature of what is protected rather than the degree of power that the 
potential obligor might hold?129  
 The conceptual limits of horizontality open a long debate, but it is a 
foundational one. As noted earlier, the need to contain the initially open-ended nature 
of the horizontality doctrine has been met – and continues to be met – with the 
legalistic distinction between Treaty rights and directives. However, a proper 
application of horizontal effect is in itself imbued with some limits: not all individuals 
are, at all times, capable of prejudicing the fundamental rights of others. While 
indirect forms of horizontality can be envisaged for virtually all fundamental rights 
(and principles), private parties may not always be in a position to violate the 
fundamental rights of all other private parties directly. When the dispute is one 
between right-holders, discussing the aggregate impact of horizontal effect on the 
fundamental rights of the parties concerned by balancing them against one another is 
necessary in order to ensure that the enabling, positive-liberty-enhancing properties of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Brysk, n 106 supra, 24. See, for an argument in this regard: D Leczykiewicz, ‘Horizontal 
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129 Clapham, n 107 supra, 533–34. See also n 68 supra, regarding the references to these principles in 
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horizontality for the party claiming the right do not in fact result in an undue 
abridgment of the liberty and effective enjoyment of the rights of the party on whom 
the obligation is imposed.130  
 It follows that, even if the limits to horizontal effect are not quite as clear as a 
distinction between different sources of EU law, the application of a set of rights to 
which a number of private parties can lay claim, prevents it from devolving into 
boundlessness. This is not to say that horizontality is easy to quantify or to nail down 
as a finite thing. Ultimately, the question of where it should stop will remain a 
difficult one, with which EU law is likely to struggle for some time. But once a 
preoccupation with its underlying justifications enters the EU horizontality discourse, 
its proper limits can be discussed by reference to clearer reasoning.   
  
VI. Conclusion 
 
This article has argued that horizontal effect cannot be excluded from the Charter’s 
scope, both because this would not follow from the Charter’s text as well as because it 
would be incompatible with the ability of EU law to produce horizontal effects in the 
sphere of fundamental rights, prior to the Charter’s entry into force. Yet, despite the 
strength of the Defrenne legacy, the Court’s subsequent application of different forms 
of horizontal effect has not reflected principled decisions as to how fundamental 
rights should enter private relations. Rather, it has relied on a mechanical process, 
whereby the default position was an attribution either of direct horizontality or, failing 
that, an application of indirect effect or state liability, without a discussion of the 
merits of each of these tools. Developing the Charter’s horizontality therefore 
involves some directional questions: is it desirable to ‘horizontalise’ rights 
frameworks traditionally applicable to states and, if so, why, and under what 
conditions? 
 To the extent that the EU doctrine in this field is far from a blank canvas, 
painting the picture of the Charter’s horizontality is an intricate exercise. It is 
important not to brush over the pre-existing case law in a way that creates further 
confusion but, at the same time, it is sometimes necessary to find space for the new 
instrument to develop. This can be difficult in what seems to be, currently, a picture 
overpopulated with different rules and no clear method. While the presence of 
horizontality in prior case law provides an incentive for the Court to delve into such 
an assessment in respect of the Charter, this is not in itself sufficient in order to 
discuss the Charter’s horizontal effect in depth.  That would involve, in part, a 
rediscovery of the reasons for horizontality available – if sparingly – in the Court’s 
early case law, such as the correction of inequalities131, and an evaluation of how the 
principles of effectiveness, primacy and uniformity, which can be identified in EU 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Frantziou ‘Right to be Forgotten’, n 91 supra, 768-769; See also: T. Scanlon, ‘Adjusting Rights and 
Balancing Values’ (2004) 74 Fordham Law Review 1477, 1478–81; R. Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, 
Balancing, and Rationality’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 131, 135-139. 
131 See most illustratively, Defrenne, n 7 supra, para 39; Kücükdeveci, n 49 supra, para 53; Angonese,  n 
47 supra, para 53. 
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horizontal effect broadly, can be used to serve fundamental rights particularly. It is 
also a question of combining this re-reading of EU law with a fresh discussion of the 
functions and merits of horizontal effect and its role in advancing fundamental rights 
in a changing world.  
 Of course, the application of fundamental rights to private parties can differ 
depending on the manner in which the obligation enters private relations (direct, 
indirect, or through the state). It should also not be assumed that the same set of 
reasons can justify the application of the Charter to all private parties, without more 
closely looking at its specific provisions or the circumstances of the particular private 
relationship. Nonetheless, focusing the debate on the essential question of the 
desirability of a horizontal protection of Charter rights should make it easier to 
establish a workable system of horizontal effect overtime. Once this basic question is 
addressed, it might be easier to situate the discussion of its more technical aspects 
anew. Could it be, for example, that the controversies regarding the Charter’s 
horizontality concern not any kind of horizontal effect but, rather, direct horizontal 
effect more specifically? If this is the case, how could this be addressed 
constructively? Could we reach some form of EU-wide consensus about the use of 
indirect horizontality employed by the EU judiciary, together with a broad conception 
of positive obligations, rather than centring the discussion on direct horizontality or 
the lack thereof? Thinking about these different alternatives does not necessarily 
mean lowering the current level of fundamental rights protection in the EU. Rather, it 
is a question of developing a more mature horizontality model in the field of 
fundamental rights, which combines pragmatism (the need to find workable solutions 
in a post-national context) with real opportunities for an effective protection of rights 
within the Charter framework. 
 There is no denying that establishing a fully-fledged and well-functioning 
horizontal rights system at the EU level will be challenging. However, embarking on 
an analysis of horizontal effect is necessary in the EU today. Questions regarding the 
horizontal effect of Charter provisions continue to reach the Court, despite its 
unwillingness openly to discuss them in its case law.132 Further, national courts are 
already being faced with cases regarding the horizontal effect of the Charter’s 
provisions, so that settling this issue at the Court of Justice level is required in order to 
avoid different interpretations of the Charter across the EU.133 Ultimately though, 
developing horizontal effect in respect of the Charter is likely to contribute to the 
setting in motion of a long-overdue, broader debate, regarding the social and political 
framework in which this new fundamental rights list is intended to operate. As 
Leczykiewicz puts it, this relates ‘not only to the appropriate reach of EU law in 
national legal orders, but also to the appropriate balance between liberalism and 
public intervention, free market and social justice.’134 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 See most recently: Case C-351/14, Rodríguez Sanchez (application lodged on 12 September 2014), 
pending.  
133 See Benkharbouche, n 100 supra. 
134 Leczykiewicz, n 128 supra, 483. 
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